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Abstract
This article advances a new understanding of the outcomes that arise from the 
movement and settlement of religion. These outcomes can range from religious accord 
to discord; or, from the full integration of migrant religions to inter-religious conflict. 
It identifies two axes that determine such outcomes. The first relates to the interplay 
between transnational religious agency and the strength of local religious structures. 
Harder structures are more likely to require migrant religious groups to make greater 
compromises to bring about situations of religious accord, while softer structures are 
less likely to do so. The second relates to the interplay between religion and other 
aspects of a migrant’s identity. Just as religion plays a more prominent role for some 
migrants, for others it is more subordinate. Combined, these two axes provide a 
framework to help understand the negotiations and compromises that arise as a result 
of religious pluralism in a globalised world.
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Résumé
Cet article propose une compréhension et des résultats nouveaux qui résultent des 
migrations et de l’établissement d’une religion. Ces résultats peuvent varier d’un accord 
à un désaccord religieux ; ou d’une intégration complète des religions migrantes aux 
conflits interreligieux. Deux axes ont été identifiés pour expliquer de tels résultats. 
Le premier axe est lié à l’interaction entre l’agentivité de la religion transnationale et 
la force des structures religieuses locales. Alors que les structures plus rigides ont 
davantage tendance à exiger aux groupes religieux migrants des compromis plus 
importants pour aboutir à des situations d’accords religieux, des structures plus souples 
ont moins tendance à faire ceci. Le deuxième axe est lié à l’interaction entre la religion 
et d’autres aspects de l’identité du migrant. Tout comme la religion peut jouer un rôle 
prédominant pour certains migrants, pour d’autres elle est moins prioritaire. Combiné, 
ces deux axes fournissent un cadre pour comprendre les négociations et les compromis 
qui résultent du pluralisme religieux dans un monde globalisé.
Mots-clés
champ social, identité religieuse, Islam, migration, religion transnationale, structure 
religieuse
The travel of religion follows the movement of people, and, like migrants, there is a 
variability with which religions evolve and adapt to new environments. In the 
contemporary era of globalisation, bodies move constantly within and between countries, 
pausing in place for short or more sustained periods. Beliefs are tied to bodies, and are 
manifested in various ways through religious presence and praxis. Few religions are 
entirely indigenous to the places in which they are found: most are imported (see 
Wohlrab-Sahr, 1999; Wong and Levitt, 2014; Woods, 2018). The vast majority of 
religions have, therefore, been deemed ‘migrant’ religions at some point in time, and 
have encountered resistance to their integration (Foucault, 1980). As religions continue 
to move and settle in place, their position within local religious landscapes must 
continually be (re)negotiated according to ever-shifting structures of religious power, 
resistance and (in)equality (Cadge et al., 2011; Markofski, 2015). Resistance reflects the 
enduring tension between stasis and change, and its legacy helps to govern the terms of 
religious pluralism in the contemporary world.
Yet, whilst the movement of religion can ignite such tensions, it can also help to 
mediate and smooth the personal upheaval brought about by migration. In other words, 
belief can provide a source of continuity and strength for spatially dislocated bodies. In 
particular, transnational religious practices enable migrants to stay connected to their 
home countries, but can also complicate the process of religious integration. Thus, 
transnational religion is that which is simultaneously rooted in, yet connects and therefore 
transcends, different localities around the world. Growth in the frequency and volume of 
such movements has caused religious landscapes to become ‘more variegated and 
complex’ (Kong, 2010: 755), and has caused the hegemony of incumbent religions to be 
redefined and reasserted in the context of increasing pluralism (Kong and Woods, 2016). 
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Thus, the movement of bodies and beliefs forces processes of religious change and 
resistance. Whilst immigration is now commonplace, the fact remains that ‘the idea that 
something as complex and extensive as the receiving society . . . should change in 
response to the arrival of by nature numerically inferior “migrants” is unheard of’ 
(Joppke, 2007: 3; see also Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000). The normative view, therefore, is 
that the ‘receiving society’ sets the terms and limits of migrant integration, which in turn 
affects migrants’ propensity to adapt to or resist the status quo.
Problematizing such an imbalance of power is the series of religiously-motivated 
terrorist events that have captured the imaginations of the media and public since 11 
September 2001. These events have heralded a shift in attitudes towards religious ‘others’ 
in general, and migrants in particular. This shift has mostly been negative, and resonates 
most strongly with the presence of Islam in the West. It has resulted in increasingly public 
discourse about the threat of migrants (and their religions) in and to the receiving society, 
and, more specifically, the fear of ‘religion’s expanding role in American society and its 
increasingly diverse character’ (Levitt, 2007: 104; see also Kong and Woods, 2016), and 
that ‘the world of Islam may do more to define and shape Europe in the twenty-first century 
than the United States, Russia, or even the European Union’ (Savage, 2004: 25; see also 
Joppke, 2007). Fear of the impact of Islam on the collective identity and public values of 
Western society stems from both its alterity, and its sustained growth: through immigration, 
through its adherents’ youth and fecundity relative to their domestic counterparts, and, 
increasingly, through conversion as well (Wohlrab-Sahr, 1999; Savage, 2004; Cesari, 2009; 
Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010; Galonnier, 2015; Ramahi and Suleiman, 2017). Accordingly, 
the study of Islam as a migrant religion in and to the West has become a ‘growth industry’ 
(Levitt, 2012: 494; Meer and Madood, 2015; Sheikh, 2015) for research,1 and provides a 
clearly defined empirical lens through which the circulation and settlement of bodies and 
their beliefs can be examined and understood.
Indeed, the various ways in which Islam has ‘grown’ in the West is instructive in 
many ways. As much as it reveals how the outcomes of migration can result in religious 
accord and/or discord, it also reveals how remarkably under-theorised the movement and 
settlement of religion is. Too often, the empirical bias of existing scholarship can render 
it idiosyncratic, and therefore limited in its explanatory potential. Compounding this is 
the fact that studies of religion in/and migration have adopted macro transnational 
perspectives that overlook the dynamics and politics of local-level religious integration. 
Thus, where existing scholarship tends to focus on the transnational practices of specific 
migrant communities and specific religious groups within those communities, this article 
provides a holistic framework for interpreting and understanding the movement and 
settlement of religion in more theoretical terms. In doing so, it advances a new 
understanding of how situations of religious accord and/or discord can arise from the 
contemporary movement and settlement of bodies and beliefs around the world. We do 
this first by examining trends and developments in the study of transnational religion, 
and its implications for religious identity, focusing specifically on the tension between 
transnational religious agency and local religious structures, and the relative role of 
religion vis-à-vis other aspects of migrant identity. Following that, we develop a new 
understanding of how the nature of migrant religiosity can result in either religious 
accord and/or discord: two poles that define the spectrum of migratory outcomes.
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Transnationalism and (im)mutable religious identities
Over the past fifteen years, the study of transnational migration has started to embrace 
religion as a key aspect of the migration process (see Kong, 2010). This has involved 
unravelling the many and varied roles of religion in the lives of migrants. Research has 
explored how religion buttresses migrants’ identities and practices, how it provides 
tangible and intangible value in terms of socialisation and support, and how religion 
itself is transformed by its movement and settlement around the world (Yang and Ebaugh, 
2001a; Hagan and Ebaugh, 2003; Levitt, 2003; 2004; 2008; Hirschman, 2004). Indeed, 
as the webs of inter-connections that thread together seemingly disparate locations (and 
the communities and groups therein) proliferate in size, strength and complexity, 
traditional, static notions of identity and belonging have been massively disrupted. 
Below we provide an overview of such disruptions: first, by identifying the role of 
religion in/and transnationalism; and, second, by introducing existing thought about 
cultural hybridity and the (im)mutable nature of religious identity.
Religion in/and transnationalism
Global forces have transformed local communities around the world, and have caused 
societies and cultures to be defined in relation to the world(s) of others. In response, 
scholars have increasingly looked beyond the boundaries (and bounded nature of) the 
nation-state to understand and explain the nature of social and religious life. Over time, 
this has involved ‘trading in the national lens for a transnational one’ (Levitt, 2007: 105; 
see also Cadge et al., 2011; Levitt, 2003; 2012), which has resulted in:
jettison[ing] the assumption that the nation-state is the natural, logical container where social 
life takes place and begins instead with a world with no set borders and boundaries. It asks why 
particular kinds of boundaries arise in particular historical contexts and assumes that these 
processes happen simultaneously in several settings and at several levels of social experience. 
(Levitt, 2007: 105)
The notions of ‘boundaries’ and ‘levels of social experience’ are central considerations 
for this article, as they help to determine the ease and extent of migrant (and religious) 
integration. Moreover, the relative strength or weakness of religious boundaries can 
predicate the extent of religious competition, conflict or co-existence within a given 
context (after Kong and Woods, 2016), and can affect migrants’ behaviours, attitudes and 
outcomes across various walks of life and in different social contexts (or their ‘levels of 
social experience’). These boundaries inform our understanding of migrant religiosity, 
and we return to them later in the article.
Boundaries can therefore help to determine the extent to which religious accord or 
discord arises as a migratory outcome, and yet research has so far failed to make this 
connection. Instead, the role of religion in discourses of transnationalism has tended to 
focus on how migrants (re)create the sense of belonging that is lost through the movement 
of bodies, rather than the negotiations that are involved in the settlement of beliefs. In 
particular, numerous studies have demonstrated how religion helps migrants ‘belong’ to 
several countries at the same time, and to an imagined, global community of religious 
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believers as well (see Levitt, 2003; 2007; 2008). By expounding the notion of ‘belonging’, 
research has examined the ways in which migrants retain ties to their countries of origin, 
and how these ties help to shape religious lives within the destination country. Such ties 
are established, maintained and strengthened through the regular flow of communications, 
money, people and ideas (also termed ‘social remittances’) between home and host 
countries. Over time, they have been shown to materialise as ‘social fields’ with 
‘tremendous transformative significance that can modify the economy, values and 
everyday lives of entire regions’ (Levitt, 2007: 106). Social fields can be multi-locational 
and multi-layered, and are defined by the connections that underpin their construction. 
They are, however, also insulated (and, therefore, isolated) from the local religious 
landscapes within which migrants live, and have distracted scholarly attention from 
explaining the variable nature of religious integration.
In spite of this, an understanding of social fields helps to explain why some migratory 
routes are stronger, and therefore less risky, than others. Strong social fields make the 
processes of migration, and the construction of transnational lifestyles thereafter, much 
easier to navigate, and help to stabilise the international movement and settlement of 
religion. Sustained migration from the Indian subcontinent to the UK over several 
generations has, for example, resulted in the establishment of religious infrastructures 
and understandings that make the movement and settlement of future generations much 
easier than it was for their forebears. Religious organisations have been shown to play an 
important role in strengthening cross-border religious ties through ‘thick, multilayered 
web[s] of links’ (Levitt, 2007: 107; see also Levitt 2004) that provide resources, support 
and a degree of institutional formality to transnational religious life. Indeed, more 
innovative scholarship has explored how strong social fields – and the (perceived) power 
of transnational religious organisations – can drive religious conversion. Akcapar (2006; 
see also Kalir, 2009), for example, shows how Iranian asylum seekers in Turkey convert 
from Shi’a Islam to Christianity in order to embed themselves within the organisational 
networks that will be most effective in facilitating their ongoing (and desired) movement 
to the US and UK.
This example demonstrates not just the functional role of social fields in enabling 
transnational religion, but its strategic one as well. It also shows how conversion can 
result in the accumulation of positive social capital, which helps to mitigate against 
the broader socio-cultural outcasting associated with their status as asylum seekers 
(see Woods, 2012a). In itself, this provides a useful and important reminder that 
religion is just one aspect of the assemblage that makes up an individual’s identity. 
Existing scholarship has, however, tended to privilege (or, worse, inflate) the role of 
religion relative to others. The fact remains that a range of identifiers, such as ethnicity, 
race, gender, language, tastes, preferences and religion – amongst others – all coalesce 
into one ever-shifting assemblage, with migrants having to negotiate ‘multiple 
pathways to incorporation simultaneously in different configurations at different 
times’ (Levitt, 2012: 495; see also Rudolph and Piscatori, 1996; Yang and Ebaugh, 
2001b; Vásquez and Marquardt, 2003; Brubaker, 2004; Glick Schiller et al., 2006; 
Chen, 2008). Indeed, given that migration represents and reflects the movement and 
diffusion of culture around the world, hybridisation has become an invariable outcome 
of migration.
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Cultural hybridity and (im)mutable religious identities
In the contemporary era of globalisation, the threshing and splicing together of different 
elements of society and culture has become normative. It is now broadly accepted (or 
even expected) for migrants in particular to feel a sense of belonging to multiple, often 
overlapping, categories of identity. As such, the construction of identity is increasingly 
predicated on negotiation and compromise, and there is a growing need to ‘mak[e] 
seemingly contradictory loyalties and cultural expectations fit’ (Levitt, 2007: 104; see 
also Wohlrab-Sahr, 1999; Gregory et al., 2012; Woods, 2017). Religion is both an input 
and outcome of such (re)constructions. Hybridised religious forms reflect the 
‘reterritorialisation’ and adaptation of religion to new contexts, as brought about by the 
fact that ‘religions have travelled as much to migrants as through migrants’ (Wong and 
Levitt, 2014: 349, emphasis added). Indeed, in some instances, religious organisations 
like the Islamic missionary movement, Tablighi Jamaat, have emerged to rid transnational 
religious communities of their ‘syncretic impurities and impose scriptural orthodoxy’ 
(Wong and Levitt, 2014: 359) instead. Examples like this start to reveal the politics of 
religious settlement and change, and how they intersect with migrant processes of 
adaptation, (re)negotiation and compromise.
Building on these ideas, research has explored how some migrant communities may be 
predisposed to more flexible understandings of identity. In such instances, hybrid identities 
may not necessarily be just an outcome of migration, but a pre-existing state of being as 
well. Two examples illustrate the point. In the first instance, ‘religion’ often has a more 
flexible and inclusivist meaning when interpreted outside of Western and/or Christian 
traditions and contexts. In Singapore and Malaysia, for example, Chinese forms of 
Buddhism are often referred to as a ‘syncretic religion’ that has expanded in definitional 
size and scope as it has been carried and settled across borders (Goh, 2009; see also Kitiarsa, 
2005). In the second instance, second-generation migrants have been shown to be born into 
an inherently more flexible way of shaping their religious identities than their parents. For 
example, the Hindu and Muslim children of Indian parents living in the US create blended 
religious identities that are based on real and imagined experience. These identities include 
their own experiences of religious life in the US and India, along with the imagined 
experiences of their parents’ religious upbringing in India, and their understanding of US 
religious traditions other than their own, notably Christian (Cadge et al., 2011). Such 
creations are a form of negotiation between the religious expectations of their families and 
ethnic communities, and the dominant milieu in which they have been born and raised. 
Flexibility is central to migrant integration, and we return to this later in the article.
The ideas that underpin these examples help to reveal important axes of opinion that 
must be recognised and reconciled in order to develop the discourse further. Two axes are 
of particular importance for this article. The first is the interplay between transnational 
religious agency and local religious structures; the second is the interplay between 
religion and other aspects of a migrants’ identity. Exploring these axes in more detail can 
lend new perspectives to the role of ‘boundaries’ and ‘levels of social experience’ in the 
formation and expression of identity and socio-cultural integration. We do so in the next, 
and unravel some of the factors involved in determining the outcomes of the movement 
and settlement of religion.
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Negotiating the outcomes of transnational religion
Whilst mobility may be associated with agency, and transnationalism with deterritorialised 
(religious) practices, this does not mean that migrants are immune to the complicating 
effects of inter-religious relations, or the religious structures that dominate a locality. In 
fact, religious agency is often inequitably distributed, and is relativized by the socio-
religious context within which it is expressed. This dialectic of distribution and relativized 
expression is caused by the enduring tension between transnational religious agency – 
manifested in the form of transnational social fields – and the mediating effect of local 
religious structures (Glick Schiller, 2005; after Rudolph and Piscatori, 1996). The 
outcomes of this tension reflect the fact that there are ‘multiple pathways of [migrant] 
incorporation’ (Glick Schiller et al., 2006: 615), and therefore helps to determine the 
limits of religious identity and expression, especially amongst migrants affiliated with 
marginal religious communities. Accordingly, it determines the dynamics of introducing 
a new religion, from seeking accommodation and acceptance by other religions, to 
seeking full integration into the religious structure of a locality. To gain a clearer 
understanding of the possible outcomes of transnational religion, we now explore, in 
turn, the interplay of transnational religious agency and local religious structures, and of 
religion versus other aspects of a migrant’s identity.
Transnational religious agency and local religious structures
Whilst migration itself is a process of disruption in the life of a migrant (and the 
community that they move from and to), transnational practices help to minimise and 
manage such disruption. In many instances, they are a source of agency, with the extent 
of religious agency often being a function of the strength of transnational ties (whether 
social, cultural, economic or political), and/or the size of the migrant population. The 
problem, however, is that ‘many scholars of transnational migration view the social 
fields engendered by transnational migration as anomalous’ (Glick Schiller, 2005: 441) 
and, therefore, divorced from the broader local structures within which they are framed. 
Whilst theoretical approaches such as structuration – the reflexive influence of structure 
on agency, and agency on structure – provide a framework for understanding such 
tensions, they have rarely been applied to religion (Morawska, 2003; after Giddens, 
1984; cf. Glick Schiller, 2005). Instead, there is a tendency for the transnational religiosity 
of migrants to be treated in acontextual terms, despite the fact that transnational agency 
is invariably relativized by the religious structures within which it is expressed.
Whilst a unique characteristic of some transnational religious groups is that they may 
consciously choose to insulate themselves from the host society – choosing instead to 
import religious leaders from overseas, and to restrict participation to members of the 
migrant community (through linguistic exclusivism, for example) – there is little 
understanding of how such strategies impact, and are impacted by, other religious groups. 
The closest we can get is the example of Gujarati migrants in the US, who are shown to 
cultivate a form of Hindu exclusivism as ‘a way to protect themselves and their children 
from what they perceived as inferior Western values’ (Levitt, 2004: 13; see also Levitt, 
2008). This sense of social and cultural superiority is reinforced by the fact that the sadhus2 
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based in their local temple are transplanted directly from India, speak no English, do not 
interact with women, and are otherwise oblivious to life in the US beyond the temple walls. 
The problem is that examples like this treat the migrant community as being isolated from 
the social, political and cultural context within which it operates. It is distinct from the 
community-at-large, and the Hindu temple is interpreted as an autonomous organisation 
that is not influenced by – nor does it influence – the perceptions or actions of other 
religious organisations. Simply put, there is a tendency for discourses of migrant religion 
to focus on intra-religious relations at the transnational level, and, to a lesser extent, 
religion-intra-community relations at the local level, but rarely inter-religious relations. A 
notable exception is the study by Gregory et al. (2012: 323) of how migrant children in 
London draw on their various ethno-religious backgrounds to create syncretic, faith-based 
narratives that are ‘greater than the sum of the constituent parts’ that enable them to be ‘a 
head taller than in any one of their separate worlds’. In this case, the children’s religious 
agency was amplified by integrating English linguistic and cultural traditions with their 
Hindu, Muslim, Catholic and Pentecostal faiths, a process that resulted in syncretic 
religious understandings, enhanced creativity, and the forging of stronger inter-group 
relationships.
There are two key reasons for the acontextual nature of existing discourse. The first is 
that, whilst transnational religion is often enabled and formalised by religious organisations, 
existing work tends to focus on the experiences of the migrant. Focussing on the strategies 
of integration employed by religious organisations that cater to migrant communities 
(whether exclusively or not) would help broaden the discourse, not least because religious 
organisations are much more visible than migrants, and, therefore, are much more 
accountable to the various public spaces in which they operate. The second is the fact that 
it draws heavily on the empirical terrain of the US and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe, 
where integration is taken as normative, in order to draw general conclusions about the 
mechanics of migrant religiosity. In the US, after all, the ‘social climate in general is also 
more tolerant of ethnic diversity’ (Levitt, 2007: 113; Wong and Levitt, 2014); an ideal that 
is not only variably applied throughout the US (both spatially and temporally), but that 
other countries may not extend to their migrant communities to the same extent and in the 
same way. As an outcome of such privileging, discourse reflects a benign and largely 
uncritical view of religion, taking integration as its goal or outcome, and politics as 
something that resides within religious groups, rather than between them (see Ammerman, 
2009; Cadge et al., 2011). Religion is, however, a fluid category of understanding that is 
relativized by its position within (or, more problematically, without) the mosaic of religions 
within which it is embedded. Migrant religions – or religions popularly associated with 
migrants – are at a natural disadvantage, as they are often deemed outside, or ‘other’, to 
prevailing religious hierarchies. Accordingly, not only do situations of religious pluralism 
invariably result in religious tension, but migrant religions are often placed in positions of 
marginality relative to prevailing socio-cultural and religious norms.
Religion in/and identity
In the second instance, research has tended to focus exclusively on the impact of religion 
on a migrant’s identity, yet it is important to bear in mind the fact that such identities are 
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shaped and defined by various factors, not just religion. The dislocation associated with 
migration can, however, cause religion to play a greater or lesser role in the (re)construction 
of identity. Indeed, whilst religion was ‘once . . . kept analytically separate’ from ethnicity 
in enabling processes of transnational affiliation, it has since been embraced (Glick 
Schiller, 2005: 443; see also Glick Schiller et al., 2006). So far, scholarship has, however, 
tended to privilege the more agentic aspects of migrant religiosity, as evinced in 
associations with ideas of ‘cosmopolitanism,’3 ‘global citizenship’, as well as more 
peripheral socio-economic groups that find strength in transnational religion (after Levitt, 
2008; see, however, Naylor and Ryan, 2003; Karagiannis and Glick Schiller, 2006). 
Relatively less consideration has been given to the more reactive (or less powerful) forms 
of migrant religiosity; those built on the premise of negotiation and compromise in 
response to the local religious structures in which they have been embedded. Even 
expressions of cultural hybridity tend to assume that the migrants pick and choose from 
different cultural signifiers in order to develop an identity to suit their circumstances. 
Thus, the fact is that for some migrants, ‘boundary crossing or combining elements from 
different faiths is the rule, not the exception’ (Levitt, 2007: 110; for example, Gregory 
et al., 2012), and this is treated as unproblematic and without consequence. The reality, 
however, is that many migrants operate from positions of socio-cultural marginality, and 
are constantly, therefore, responding to their surroundings. Moreover, such marginality 
elevates the potential – or the need – for self-censorship or self-denial in response to 
different circumstances; a dynamic that remains hitherto unexplored.
More does need to be done to recognise the role of religion within the broader 
assemblage of migrant identity, and how the transnational agency afforded by the non-
religious aspects of migrants’ identity mediates religious expression and vice versa. As 
the ‘ethnic lens’ of transnational studies was once criticised for obscuring ‘the diversity 
of migrants’ relationships to their place of settlement and to other localities around the 
world’ (Glick Schiller et al., 2006: 613), so too does an exploration of religion as isolated 
from other aspects of identity obscure the complex interplay of competing forces that 
coalesce to ultimately determine the extent and limits of religious expression. Whilst 
some studies have shown a sensitivity to the coupling of religious and other identities, 
showing how one can affect the other, this body of work is small, albeit innovative. 
Notably, Sinha (2005; see also Hewelmeier and Krause, 2009) demonstrates how, in 
India, the Hindu god Muneeswaran is often worshipped by the lower castes, whereas in 
Singapore, it is worshipped by middle-class Hindus. This is explained by the upward 
socio-economic mobility experienced by Indian migrants to Singapore, and the associated 
reframing of religion alongside socio-economic gains. This creates tensions and divisions 
between established Indian migrants to Singapore (who have attained middle-class 
status), and their lower caste counterparts, which can restrict their religious integration. 
Little, however, is known about the strategies employed by religious organisations to 
help overcome such socio-cultural rifts amongst their adherents.
The prevailing assumption, however, is that ‘their [migrants’] primary identification 
is not to the nation but to the global religious community’ (Levitt, 2007: 108), and that 
religious praxis is only a local manifestation of global religious belonging. Such 
assumptions reflect the fact that the discourse is heavily influenced by learnings from 
Islamic and Christian traditions (and by the US/Europe as receiving countries), both of 
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which promote a sense of global belonging (Menjivar, 1999; 2003), and, in the case of 
Islam, prescriptions on dress, diet and conduct (especially amongst women). In addition, 
other, more wide-ranging socio-cultural aspects of identity – such as ethnicity, gender, 
language or profession – are typically either absent in existing work, or conflated with 
religion. ‘Cultural talk’, as Cesari (2009: 2) puts it, is currently limited by its ‘overemphasis 
[of] the role of religion in the process of integration’. Besides being an analytical 
oversight, this can also have potentially damaging consequences in the public domain. 
Speaking of Islam in Europe, for example, Cesari (2009: 2) criticises the tendency for 
‘politicians and academics . . . [to] conflat[e] factors such as immigrant background, 
ethnicity, socio-economic deprivation and the war on terror with Islam as a religion’. 
Conflating religion with other constructs not only causes confusion about the actual role 
of religion in academic discourse, but can also taint the public perception of – and create 
discrimination against – migrant communities in the real world.
Accordingly, research needs to situate religion within a broader schema of socio-cultural 
forces at play more carefully, not least because such forces have compounding effects that 
shape the extent to which migrant groups are absorbed into, or rejected from, local religious 
structures. The view that ‘faith guides the way that they [migrants] live their everyday 
lives, with whom they associate, and the kinds of communities they belong to, even among 
those who say they are not very religious’ (Levitt, 2007: 109, emphasis added) clearly 
reflects the biases that are embedded within – and that have stymied – the discourse. These 
biases not only privilege religion above all else, but also uncritically assume that migrant 
religiosity is divorced from both other religious actors, and from the socio-cultural 
structures within which it is expressed. In the next section, we seek to overcome such 
shortcomings by developing a new understanding of migrant religiosity.
Towards a new understanding of migrant religiosity
Migrants create – and, over time, are created, by – new religious architectures that must 
be established and developed amongst pre-existing encampments of religious actors. By 
religious architectures, we refer to the materialisation of religious belief and praxis 
through, for example, organisations, buildings, posters, clothing, diet, and any other 
symbolic manifestation of religious identity. The reality, therefore, is that ‘the religious 
landscapes on which modern travelling faiths attempt to take root are not inert traditional 
religious fields’ (Wong and Levitt, 2014: 359). Rather, they mediate religious settlement 
and assimilation, and play an important role in shaping the composition and nature of the 
local religious landscape. In addition, migrants – and their religious architectures – are 
mediated by the socio-cultural milieus in which they find themselves living and working 
in their host countries. Over time, the religious architectures of migrants become 
embedded alongside what came before, creating a mosaic of religions that both reflects 
and, over time, can determine the religious structure of a locality (after Woods, 2013). 
The mosaic of religions that are active within a given locality exists in a constant state of 
flux, as ‘meeting the other symbolic system promotes a redefinition of one’s own, but 
also a definition of the identity of the other one’ (Wohlrab-Sahr, 1999: 351). It is 
constantly being (re)negotiated in response to various factors. These include government 
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legislation, the relative size and strength of different religious (and ethnic) groups, the 
rate of inter-religious conversion, natural disasters, the media, and so on.
In light of this reimagination of how religions move and settle, it should be clear that 
integration (especially of migrant religions) is not normative; often, it is the exception 
rather than the rule. The terms of exchange involve manifold factors: the agency of the 
migrant (which, in many instances, correlates with socio-economic, or socio-cultural 
status), the presence and strength of pre-existing social fields, the strength and 
co-operability of incumbent religious groups, the degree of pre-existing religious 
pluralism or singularity, as well as any intra-group divisions or schisms. At best, dominant 
religious groups may allow the co-existence – or accommodation – of other religions as 
long as they are not perceived to be a threat; at worst, marginal religious groups may 
have to operate underground or informally to avoid surveillance, censorship or attack. 
Religious parity – the treatment of all religious groups on equal terms – is therefore rare, 
even under conditions of pluralism. Accordingly, there is a need to better understand 
‘how the stories nations tell themselves about who they are, and how they perform 
themselves to members and non-members alike, influence immigrant incorporation’ 
(Levitt, 2012: 497–498). In some countries, religious elites may actively ‘securitize’ 
public discourses of religion in order to entrench prejudices and reaffirm the marginal 
status of ‘other’ religious groups (see, for example, Karyotis and Patrikios’s 2010 
discussion of the hegemonic role of the Orthodox Church in Greece). Indeed, in the 
context of Islamic migration, ‘the battle for Europe’ can be understood as ‘a battle over 
the right of [Muslim] self-definition’ (Kepel, 2004: 287; see also Taarnby, 2005) in the 
face of Christian hegemony. Thus, just as religious and ethnic characteristics help to 
define levels of migrant integration (Yang and Ebaugh, 2001b), so too do levels of 
migrant integration affect the extent to which religions are absorbed into (and accepted 
by) the religious structure of a locality.
An important aspect of our understanding of migrant religiosity is that it does not 
treat religion as an isolated variable, but one that is defined in relation to other, 
ostensibly ‘non-religious’ variables. It recognises the adaptive necessity of most 
migrant religions in the face of ‘discrimination, economic hardship, and social 
exclusion’, and the pervasive reality – felt in various ways and to varying degrees in 
different contexts around the world – that ‘the assumption of assimilation is no longer 
omnipresent’ (Karagiannis and Glick Schiller, 2006: 140). Adaptation is often based on 
the premise that religion is just one, inter-connected component of an ever-shifting 
mosaic of socio-cultural interactions that ultimately mediate how a migrant lives his/
her life. Admittedly, for some migrants, in some contexts, religion looms larger than 
for other migrants in other contexts, but it is rare for religion to be the one force 
shaping how he/she lives her life in the migrant destination. Moreover, because identity 
is an ‘ensemble of subject positions’ (after Mouffe, 1992), its different elements 
interact and shape one another such that ‘during a particular struggle, one dimension 
of identity prevails… [and] its other dimensions are defined in relation to that 
predominant position’ (Levitt, 2008: 787). Thus, whilst Levitt (2004) suggests that the 
state is the predominant arbiter of religious expression, we recognise the state as being 
just one actor in a web of cultural, social, economic and political actors that work 
together to condone, mediate or censor such expression, and that in diverse contexts, 
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different actors play more significant roles in shaping religious expression. As a result 
of this web of influence, we can begin to see how religious identities are constructed 
in response to myriad factors. Whilst some may be ‘hidden from public view because 
of feelings of shame and guilt’ (Taarnby, 2005: 31), others may respond to the religious 
structure in a more reflexive way in the search for socio-cultural acceptance. The 
flexibility associated with religious accord is now explored in more detail.
Religious accord/discord and the spectrum of migratory 
outcomes
Migration does not just result in the movement and settlement of religion, but in a host 
of other potential outcomes as well. Whenever religion stops moving, it must settle. 
Wherever it settles, it reveals how ‘new overlays land on pockmarked geographies, 
enabling some things to travel easily while inhibiting others’ (Wong and Levitt, 2014: 
351). Bodies rarely change when they are moved, but beliefs are often expected to 
undergo processes of adaptation in response to the religious structure of the host country 
or locality. The hardness of a religious structure dictates the degree of adaptation required; 
harder structures suggest thicker, more impenetrable boundaries, and therefore command 
greater adaptation; softer structures suggest thinner, more penetrable boundaries, and 
therefore require relatively less adaptation. Compounding this is the fact that religious 
organisations often play a central role in determining how migrants adapt to local 
religious environments, and should therefore provide a focus of future research and 
analysis. Accordingly, there is a need to understand how the religious structures of 
different contexts engender different ‘philosophies of integration’ (after Favell, 2001), 
which may, in turn, affect the presence of (implicitly, public) religious alternatives. 
Religious accord and discord represent two broad-based categories that encompass a 
greater range of religious outcomes. In terms of accord, outcomes range from 
accommodation to integration, and often reflect complementary relationships with the 
religious structure of a locality; in terms of discord, outcomes range from exclusion to 
conflict, and often reflect antagonistic relationships with the religious structure. Below 
we explore these two categories in more detail, first by examining the flexibility 
associated with religious accord, followed by the conservatism associated with discord.
Religious accord: From accommodation to integration
Religious accord refers to relationships between new and incumbent religious groups 
that are, generally speaking, complementary. Over time, new religious groups may shift 
from a position of accommodation by the pre-existing religious structure (i.e. where they 
exert influence from outside the structure), to one of full integration within the religious 
structure (i.e. where they exert influence from inside the structure). Accommodation 
therefore refers to a degree of acceptance as a religious other, but presence is often 
manifested through the use of informal spaces for religious purposes. Integration reflects 
a formalisation of acceptance within the religious structure of a locality, in some instances 
manifested in the construction of formal places of worship, and the treatment by 
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incumbent religions as a peer rather than an outsider. To facilitate accommodation and, 
ultimately, integration into the religious structure, migrant religions usually express a 
degree of flexibility in adapting their beliefs and practices in a way that is amenable to 
the local milieu. Often, the religious structure will dictate the terms of religious 
accommodation and integration, with harder structures reflecting the need for greater 
flexibility; the reverse is true for softer structures.
Such flexibility is witnessed amongst some Muslim migrants in Europe, who are 
defined in public discourse as being part of an ‘ultimate[ly] abject people’ (Silverstein, 
2005: 376), causing integration to be a long and complex process. A key barrier to 
integration is that many forms of Islamic belief and practice – such as wearing a hijab 
in public – are interpreted as political acts. It has reached a point where ‘anti-terrorism 
and security concerns fuel a desire to compromise liberties and restrict Islam from the 
public space’ (Cesari, 2009: 2; see also Silverstein, 2005; Taarnby, 2005; Karyotis and 
Patrikios, 2010), which has resulted in restrictions on immigrants from Muslim 
countries, and less flexibility in the accommodation of Islamic beliefs and practices. 
Compounding such inflexibility is the (perceived) conflation of Islamic religious and 
cultural practices, which causes some practices (like wearing a hijab in public) to be 
(mis)interpreted as an antagonistic expression of cultural, more than religious, agency. 
In the Netherlands and Germany, for example, immigrants must espouse Western liberal 
values before crossing the border in order to demonstrate a degree of compatibility with 
the defined lifestyles and values of the host country. This reflects a hardening of the 
religious structure, which necessitates greater flexibility on behalf of migrants in order 
to bring about situations of religious accord.
In response to such a rejection of difference across many European societies, many 
Muslim migrants have demonstrated a more flexible approach to (the practice of) belief, 
which helps them overcome barriers to integration. They have made ‘accommodations in 
their [religious] practices to fit into Western society’ (Cesari, 2009: 8; see also Savage, 
2004) in order to integrate and induce their acceptance into the religious structure. This 
has involved praying less frequently and in less disruptive ways; a more flexible form of 
religiosity that ‘extend[s] to almost all rituals or practices’ (Cesari, 2009: 9; see also 
Bowen, 2004), and has involved an almost complete reimagination and redefinition of 
what being a Muslim in Europe entails. The fact that Muslim migrants in Europe tend to 
be socio-economically marginalised further highlights the willingness to integrate by 
compromising their religious identity in the hope that doing so will grant them a degree 
of integrationist cultural agency that could in turn reduce their overarching sense of 
‘otherness’. Combined, this demonstrates the power of religious structures in dictating 
the terms within which migrant – or marginal – forms of religiosity can be expressed, and 
how religious accord is often predicated on the flexibility of belief and practice.
Religious discord: From exclusion to conflict
Religious discord refers to more antagonistic relationships between new and incumbent 
religious groups. Over time, if situations of religious exclusion (i.e. where a religious 
presence – either informal or formal – is denied by the religious structure) are not 
addressed and rectified, they can mutate into religious conflict (i.e. where a religious 
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presence is actively removed by the religious structure). Exclusion reflects the tolerance 
of religious others as long as their religious identity is not expressed. Conflict reflects 
a growing intolerance of religious others, irrespective of whether their identity is 
expressed or not, and active steps taken to marginalise, if not obliterate, religious 
others. Bearing this in mind, religious discord arises from either a pre-existing 
inflexibility in belief, excessive discrimination towards marginal religious groups, or a 
combination of both forces at once. Often, it reflects either excessively (i.e. outside the 
normal bounds of acceptance) hard religious structures, and/or excessively antagonistic 
expressions of religious agency.
For example, some Muslim migrants have ‘a physical presence in Europe but no 
accommodation with European society’ (Savage, 2004: 44). In itself, this reveals how the 
misalignment between bodies (‘presence’), belief (‘accommodation’) and context 
(‘society’) can create situations of discrimination, and, therefore, discord. Such 
discrimination can cause some migrants to strengthen their religiosity in the search for 
dignity and ideological emancipation. Taken to the extreme, the feelings of social 
isolation and the crisis of identity that such discrimination can bring about can also push 
migrants towards positions of religious extremism, which find ‘solidarity, meaning, and 
direction in radical Islamist groups that are actively looking for such recruits’ (Savage, 
2004: 33; see also Juergensmeyer, 2003; Taarnby, 2005). This dynamic reinforces the 
marginal – and feared – position of migrant religion, and serves to further harden the 
religious structure.
Whilst some migrants respond to the religious structure by strengthening their beliefs 
and moving towards positions of religious conservatism, others may reframe the situation 
in order to justify their marginality and understand the resulting conflict with dominant 
religions. Such reframing is common amongst Pentecostal and Islamic communities, 
who often construct boundaries between the imagined community of their belief, and the 
restrictive religious structure within which migrants must practice their religion. Doing 
so is part of the construction of a ‘terrain of control’ that renders such communities 
seemingly impervious to the workings of a religious structure as they are ‘theologically 
predisposed against accommodation strategies’ (Bauman and Ponniah, 2017: 74; see also 
Bowen, 2004; Csordas, 2009). As Peterson and Vásquez (2001: 40) explain with regard 
to Pentecostalism:
Since this closed social terrain [of control] is ultimately grounded in the radical deterritorialization 
demanded by the reign of God, it mirrors the erasure of borders and identities that is central to 
globalization. In other words, for all its emphasis on the self, Pentecostalism, like global 
capitalism, homogenizes, making particularity only a strategy or stepping stone toward the 
production of globality/universality.
Such reframing nullifies the influence of the local-scale religious structure on the beliefs 
and practices of migrants, and can serve to catalyse conflict in many (non-Christian) 
contexts around the world (see Woods, 2012b). As an idealised vision of a trans-boundary 
religious community, practices like these are often encouraged by the religious 
organisations that serve migrant communities, and which serve to benefit from migrants 
expressing allegiance to them rather than more locally-embedded religious groups. 
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Tablighi Jamaat, for example, has grown significantly amongst disoriented and socio-
economically (and ethnically) marginalised Muslim diasporas in France and the UK, 
amongst whom their message resonates and actually ‘reinforces the lifestyle of ethnic 
exclusivity and societal parallelism that is already in place’ (Wong and Levitt, 2014: 
356). Such ‘exclusivity’ and ‘parallelism’ are often exacerbated by the spatial segregation 
of migrant communities, which serves to enhance the ‘visibility and impact’ of religious 
alterity, and to ‘circumscrib[e] day-to-day contact with the general population’ (Savage, 
2004: 29). Actions like these not only reflect a rejection of the religious structure, but 
also fuel the destructive cycle of inter-religious hardening and distantiation over time.
Conclusion
This article has provided a critical overview of the movement and settlement of 
religion, and has offered a new perspective to help understand its variable outcomes. 
Beyond its application to different empirical contexts around the world, two inter-
related areas of focus can help to further advance the ideas outlined in this article. The 
first pertains to the construction of public discourses of religion. In particular, research 
needs to uncover how ‘religious actors can themselves be powerful discourse 
entrepreneurs’, which can lead to them occupying positions as the ‘guardians of 
national identity’ (Karyotis and Patrikios, 2010: 44–45). Such positions can play an 
active role in crystallising ‘fluid categories of difference into fixed species of 
otherness’ (Silverstein, 2005: 364), which has real ramifications for the acceptance 
and integration of migrant religions. Religious organisations often play an integral 
role in helping or hindering migrant integration into host countries, yet research has 
not yet explored in detail the strategies of integration employed by such organisations, 
and their wider-ranging effects on local religious adherents and society-at-large. 
Exploring how such strategies (and their effects) change across religions, migrant 
groups and contexts will help to unravel the reasons why some migrant groups are 
more readily, and more easily, integrated than others.
The second pertains to the varied effects of such public discourses, especially with 
regard to the regulation of religion. Any religion is, by its very nature, multi-faceted; the 
transnational and supranational dimensions of religion can further complicate such a 
dynamic. Throughout Europe, the rapid and relatively recent growth in the population of 
Muslim migrants has led to the formulation of policy that has paradoxically contributed 
to the ‘securitisation’ of Islam whereby ‘the measures intended to prevent radicalisation 
actually engender discontent and prompt a transformation of religious conservatism to 
fundamentalism’ (Cesari, 2009: 1; see also Silverstein’s 2005 notion of a ‘new savage’). 
Building on this, the role of marginal and/or migrant religious actors in discourses of 
domestic security remains under-studied, despite having significant consequences for the 
meaning of religious pluralism in the contemporary world, and the recalibration of 
domestic and international politics in response to the ever-shifting religious landscape 
(see Savage, 2004). Linking together the regulation of religion with the hardening of 
religious structures will contribute to a more theoretically-informed understanding of the 
destructive cycle of religious discord, and how this cycle can be managed and mitigated 
across time and space. Until such an understanding is reached, inter-religious relations 
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will continue to be undermined by the stultifying effects that stem from the defence of 
the self, and the fear of the other.
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Notes
1. As an example of the interest in Islam in/and the West, Social Compass published a special 
issue on ‘Being Muslim in North America and Europe’ in December 2015.
2. A sadhu is a holy man or teacher.
3. Levitt (2008: 785) also associates cultural hybridity with being a form of ‘rooted 
cosmopolitan[ism]’.
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